Let's put this common refrain to rest~ something that I hear all the time in arguments concerning religion. It goes something like this:
" Remember, you can't prove a negative!"
This has become much more common, especially in the arguments amongst Atheists and agnostics concerning certainty, and it really puzzles me how people can be skeptical and free-thinkers, yet take to an idea so easily and not question it. I will elaborate on this a little more once I have the time, but let me start all of those "can't prove a negative" types off with a question~ " I am not sitting at my desk." Thats a negative claim. Are you telling me that there is no way to confirm or disprove that?
I am not fully understanding your "mental structures" et.al. How would you describe the idea of marriage in your view?
Your paragraph about "irrationality" and "wrong" can be summarized in this sentence: Those terms are not enough because they don't explain why.
How does a "unified structural approach" deny "subjective evidence"?
The "domain of the data source", I think, means considering the source. How do you consider and choose between the myriad of sources?
I wrote some explanatory sentences for that, but I trimmed it out since a lot of my responses have been running a bit long.
Mental structures are identical to their physical counterparts in all but two respects: they display macroscopic discontinuity (instead of at nano-scales) and they are surrounded by impermanent flows of information (instead of a void-like environment). Otherwise, all the same phenomena in physics, engineering, etc. have equivalents within the mental context.
The main advantage of a structural approach ('unified' was just trying to be a bit more clear) is that the mind is treated not as a private object, but more like one painting in an art gallery. The result is a situation much like reference frames in general relativity; regardless of how many minds are involved, there's still only one reality to describe, so subjectivity becomes a mostly trivial distinction when structural transformations allow interchangeable mental perspectives.
The main challenge in doing that, though, is properly attributing data sources, as the discontinuity inherent in minds can make it challenging to decompose an experience or evaluation into their component sources. That's where a structural theory can be very useful for identifying disjunctive data and sorting it out.
I have reread your last post four times. And the fourth time was when I started to understand what you are trying to convey. Though I think it would have been much more enlightening for me if you would have included what you trimmed out, I will try to convey what I understood from your post.
Mental structures are ideas that equate to knowledge. So, an idea of ice cream is equivalent data to an idea of marriage.
So, in our minds, reality is the accumulation of the "paintings"? What if one of those paintings is of a magician who stabbed his assistant but the assistant was not harmed. There is a conflict, but in real good deceptions, there may not be any conflict. Or are deceptions out of scope of what we were talking about?
I may be blind, but I do not see any explanation of how "structural theory can be very useful for identifying disjunctive data and sorting it out".
I have been thinking a great deal about what you have said so far and thought of an analogy that you might agree with:
In math, there is a structure that would allow us to see data that would take much longer without it. With math, we can calculate 25 plus 25 equals 50 in a matter of a few seconds, but without math, we would have to count all 50 things get the same answer.
Does your mental structure have the same power as the structure of math?
I meant, more specifically, that the mind is a painting, a distinctive image which has been compiled over time using a unique palette of colors and pattern of strokes-- yet it remains fundamentally comparable to any other painting. I could also call it personality or personal identity, where specific ideas or belief systems are fragments of identity within the 'whole' mind of a person.
A strong historical trend in Western philosophy has been the conviction that the mind is private, which means that one person can only ever know what's in his own head; he can never look at another person and know that their minds work the same (or even that the other has a mind-- it's philosophically invisible to him). I wanted to make the point that I strictly reject that premise based on the comparable structural nature of minds, so when I say "red" and you say "red", it's possible to demonstrate that we hold identical concepts of "red" through structural means.
The main problem that occurs when discussing knowledge is misattribution. If, in the above example, I was pointing to a red object in front of me, but you were imagining a shade of red, then we are actually discussing distinct data sources-- one is a mental subject, while the other is a physical subject. The underlying issue with this situation is that human memory stores all its data in the same place, so two weeks later you'd be unable to distinguish between which red you saw and which one you simulated.
The role of a structural theory is to take that muddled data and cleanly break it apart according to clean structural divisions using the phenomenological indicators for each data source.
For example, if you have the memory of a man walking up to a wall, then suddenly appearing on the opposite side to continue walking, what type of knowledge is it? Since it clearly contains a major discontinuity (people can't teleport like that), it has to be a mental event (you imagined a man doing that, or someone communicated their imagining of such by some medium).
So with your magician example, the necessary step for clearing up the muddled situation is to sort the data: continued sensory data says the assistant is unharmed, and upon examination the memory of stabbing the assistant is fragmented, with no clear sense of what happened before or afterwards. This indicates that the memory of the stabbing contains mental data, not physical data, so while it will affect the magician's mind and his decisions, it cannot affect the condition of the physical world (the assistant will remain un-stabbed).
Your math example points out that there are multiple structural divisions to consider. I would label the main divisions as a priori/a posteriori (math vs. counting), analytic/synthetic (identification vs. deduction), and physical/mental (external a posteriori vs. internal a posteriori origin in memory). There are further structural breakdowns within the physical and mental categories, but these divisions are a good starting point for sorting out muddled data.
To take a fairly close test case, how would you sort out the data involved in religious beliefs? What are the source(s) of the experiences which support a religious identity? Can these experiences be counteracted by philosophic argument (a priori data), or do they belong to a different structural class?
^ It's hard to nail down fine details without getting posts this long, but the column shrinking exaggerates it some.
Your explanations are making sense to me.
You are describing the way the mind works which would make terms like wrong a bit more complicated.
Personal identity - sum of all the parts of the painting.
Mental subject - an idea such as marriage or imagining a shade of red. Also, a memory.
Physical subject – sensory evidence. What you see, smell, feel, hear, taste.
In the example of the magician stabbing his/her assistant, what if all the data you had was the witnessing of the stabbing, but not of the fact that the assistant was unharmed?
Test case – Using your system, I would think that religious beliefs are mental synthetic a priori. The same would support a religious identity. Again, using your system, you probably would not be able to counteract these experiences with philosophic argument unless the mind is open to being convinced. I don’t know if you need another class.
The magician case highlights the fundamental problem with relying solely on witnesses: it could, quite literally, be completely imagined without any intention from the witness to deceive. I would think the best way to be certain it's a physical memory is if there are unknowns in it; a smell, sound, color, etc. that the individual can't match up against their experiences well, so they can remember it strongly but are unable to describe it by analogy. Since mentally-generated memories are inherently constructed from other memories, such a gap indicates a foreign, external element. So while you can obtain indirect evidence this way, it's often much more efficient to simply search for direct physical evidence.
Side note: I'd only apply mental/physical to a posteriori experiences since there is no a priori data collection.
Religious beliefs originating from synthetic a priori knowledge would result in something like Spinoza's Monism, where his attempts to understand the structure of existence lead to the conclusion that the universe must be underlaid and synonymous with a necessary God.
That's not how most people approach it. Most people acquire religious beliefs through physical-social experiences as a member of a religious community, bonding with other worshipers and being accepted into the group. The general data class for religious faith would then be physical, analytic a posteriori (the personal religious identity), while their religious beliefs (rituals, behaviors of God, etc.) would be physical, synthetic a posteriori ("If I have this faith, then I must believe...").
Most philosophy deals with a priori analysis, so nothing Spinoza ever wrote would affect someone's sense of belonging in a religious community. Science is primarily about collecting physical analytic a posteriori data (the identity of what is and how it's put together), so it overlaps with religious faith, but not the dependent religious beliefs. Deductive arguments about human choice, etc. can overlap with beliefs, but not the primary faith.
So this would suggest two primary routes to shaking religious beliefs:"How could ____ be allowed to exist in this world?" (contradiction of faith, despite beliefs)
Philosophic arguments would only appear to hold sway for other philosophers trying to build a priori frameworks. Philosophy can still demonstrate contradictions which can undercut the a posteriori experiences, but it lacks the means to build faith.
I reread the post above many times and can say I understand a little. I agree with your assessment about how most people approach religion.
"Most philosophy deals with a priori analysis,..." This is something I have learned from discussing proof of no god, but no one would say it quite like this quoted phrase.
I have a better appreciation for philosophy. My view of philosophy is this: Like math is a structure for reality, philosophy is a structure of the mind. Though I may not understand the benefits I could gain from philosophy, I have decided that I no longer wish to put forth any more effort to learn about it. The very little I have learned did not alter my belief that knowledge requires evidence and belief does not. We will always disagree on the point of there being proof of a negative, so I quit. I envy you though. You understand science and philosophy. and you choose to use philosophy in addition to science. That may be where I end up, but for now, I feel comfortable with only science.
To me if you can't prove the positive that alone proves the negative.
That's a very strange statement. So if we can't currently prove that alien life exist, that proves it does not exist? We can't yet prove that the Higgs Boson exists, so that is proof that it does not exist?
Clearly this is not the case.
The inability to prove a positive does not imply the negative. Not at all. To forget that difference is a fallacy.
Thank-you, in the same token though since I can't prove to you that fairies exist and you cannot prove that they do not, then should we waste time on the debate. The point is this plainly put. If your making a claim it is up to you to prove it. It is not my responsibility to disprove it. How can you disprove something that has not been determined to be real? The fact that it cannot be proven indeed implies it to be false. I also don't believe in aliens either and won't until I see evidence(valid) that they are real. Some things are simple to understand.That being stated does not apply to things which can be tested and then proven through testing.Beliefs that only exist in a persons head cannot be tested, because they are made up.
If your making a claim it is up to you to prove it. It is not my responsibility to disprove it. How can you disprove something that has not been determined to be real?
I agree with all that. What I do not agree with is the implication that unless we can prove a positive, the debate is therefore "a waste of time" - or worse, that it actually proves the negative.
I had hoped the example of the Higgs Boson would have set a framework. This is a hypothetical particle which - just a few years ago - we had absolutely no way of verifying it to exist or not. Nobody could prove its existence, and nobody could prove the opposite (naturally). Does that mean we should have seen that debate as a waste of time? Of course not. In fact we spend billions of dollars building a particle accelerator to help us come to a point where it could perhaps be proven.
Some questions are very much worth investigating, regardless of whether we can currently prove the positive or the negative.
"The fact that it cannot be proven indeed implies it to be false."
There's a slight language duality at work here. There's a difference between claims which cannot currently be proven, and claims which could not possibly be proven true. It's hard what to think of the second class, but suffice it to say that the God claim is not in there: clearly the existence of a God could be proven if it actually existed.
And again, for years we could not prove the existence of the Higgs Boson. And in fact we still can't (though we're getting closer). But had we given up our investigations or seen it as a waste of time, we'd be much intellectually poorer for it.
Matt again to me the God claim is a false belief that only exists in the minds of those who believe in it. Therefore to argue about it is foolish, except when that belief affects us as a whole and even in that scenario you simply point to its harm and stand against the harm. I am referring only in this case to God claims. To me it is just as foolish if you and I were debating about the existence of the tooth fairy.
p.s.clearly the existence of a God could be proven if it actually existed. Your words my point exactly. Matt this is my view and although most say they cannot say with certainty that God is not real I do. The reason being that the teaching about God is his desire to know us and we have been searching and he is not there. It is not a matter of developing the right technology to discover where he's been hiding. The truth is simple He has never been.